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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a lengthy and adversarial dispute between a father who promised his 
son the family business, and a son who worked tirelessly in establishing and managing the 
business as a result of such promise, only to get nothing. Plaintiff/Appellant Drew Thomas 
("Drew") left a promising career as a sales manager at a well established car dealership to work 
for Thomas Motors, his father's car dealership, at a lesser salary. He did so based on 
Defendant/Respondent Ron Thomas' ("Ron") promise that he would give Drew Thomas Motors 
when he retired. However, after almost ten years of working at Thomas Motors, Ron sold 
Thomas Motors for nearly three million dollars, without including or even informing Drew of the 
decision. Drew received nothing from the sale. 
Drew filed the present lawsuit in the District Court including claims for breach of 
contract or, in the alternative, quasi-contract. After multiple summary judgment motions by 
Defendants/Respondents, the Court dismissed all Drew's claims. The District Court found there 
was an express employment contract between Drew and Ron that did not include Ron's promise 
to transfer Thomas Motors to Drew. Accordingly, based on the Court's finding of an express 
contract, Drew's quasi-contract claim was dismissed. After dismissing Drew's quasi-contract 
claim, the Court, in a later decision, also dismissed Drew's breach of contract claim determining 
there was no contract to transfer the business because all the material terms had not been agreed 
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upon. For the reasons stated below, the District Court erred in its ruling on Drew's quasi-
contract claim. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On June 21, 2006, Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial including claims for breach of oral contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, quasi-contract, breach of written contract (in the alternative), and fraud. I 
Plaintiff/Appellant's breach of oral contract was based on Plaintiffleaving his job at Lanny Berg 
Chevrolet and managing and operating what would become Thomas Motors at a greatly reduced 
salary, in exchange for Defendants' promise to give Plaintiff Thomas Motors upon retirement? 
Plaintiff/Appellant's quasi-contract claim was based on the same allegations as the breach of oral 
contract claim, in the event the Court found no contract existed, considering the inequity of 
Defendants retaining the benefit conferred on them by Plaintiff without repaying Plaintiff for the 
value of that benefit.3 Although it is Plaintiffs position that no written contract was ever validly 
executed between the parties, Plaintiff/Appellant's breach of written contract (in the alternative) 
was alleged in the event it was determined a written contract had been formed based on certain 
documents drawn up by Defendants' attorney.4 
On July 24, 2007, Defendants/Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all 
five counts.s On November 26, 2007, the District Court entered an Order on Defendants' 
I R. Vol. I of6, pp. 23-33. 
2 R. Vol. 1 0[6, pp. 23-33. 
3 R. Vol. I 0[6, pp. 23-33. 
4 R. Vol. I 0[6, pp. 23-33. 
5 R. Vol. I 0[6, pp.137-139. 
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Motion for Summary Judgment denying summary judgment on Plaintiff/Appellant's claims for 
breach of oral contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but 
granting summary judgment on Plaintiff/Appellant's claims for quasi-contract, breach of written 
contract (in the alternative), and fraud. 6 In denying summary judgment on the breach of contract 
claim, the District Court found sufficient evidence of an agreement wherein Defendants 
promised to transfer Thomas Motors upon the retirement of Ron Thomas in exchange for 
Plaintiff leaving his employment at Lanny Berg and contributing his efforts and experience to 
building Thomas Motors.7 On the other hand, in granting summary judgment on the quasi-
contract claim, the District Court found "uncontroverted evidence" of an "express employment 
agreement," of which it would be improper to change the terms by application of the doctrine of 
quasi-contract.s The Court therefore concluded, "Plaintiffs assertion that he agreed to go to 
work for Thomas Motors at a reduced salary in consideration for Defendants' promise to transfer 
the business should stand or fall based upon the jury's determination of his express contract 
claim in Count L,,9 
On March 18, 2007, Defendants/Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment requesting dismissal of Plaintiff/Appellant's claim that the oral contract included any 
real property or land.1O On May 19, 2008, the District Court entered an Order on Defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment granting summary judgment on Plaintiff/Appellant's 
6R. Vol. 4 of6,pp. 742-760. 
7 R. Vol. 4 of6, pp. 749-750. 
8 R. Vol. 4 of6, p. 754. 
9 R. Vol. 4 of6, p. 754. 
10 R. Vol. 4 of6, pp. 739-741. 
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claim the oral contract included conveyance of real property. I I 
On April 6, 2009, Defendants/Respondents filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the remaining counts of breach of oral contract and breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealingY On May 18, 2009, the District Court entered an Order on Defendants' 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment granting summary judgment on Plaintiff/Appellant's 
remaining claims of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.!3 The District Court found the parties did not enter into a valid, enforceable contract for 
the transfer of Thomas Motors because: (I) a material term of the alleged agreement was for 
Plaintiff to pay a monetary price for the business; and (2) the parties never reached an agreement 
on the price or an objective means for determining the price. 14 
On May 28, 2009, Defendants/Respondents filed Defendants' Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs.1 5 On June 2, 2009, Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Court's May 18,2009 Order on Defendants' Second Motionfor Summary 
Judgment. On that same day, Defendants/Respondents filed Defendants' Motion for Additional 
Sanctions for Plaintiff's Failure to Comply with Court's Order based on Plaintiffs failure to pay 
attorney fees and costs awarded previously by the Court on a motion to compel. I6 On June 22, 
2009, all three motions were scheduled to be heard by the Court. However, at such hearing the 
Court refused to hear Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration until such time that Plaintiff paid the 
11 R. Vol. 4 of6, pp. 795-804. 
12 R. Vol. 5 of 6, pp. 954-956. 
13 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1075-1087. 
'4 R. Vol. 6 of6, p. 1085. 
"R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1130-1132. 
J6 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1135-1138. 
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outstanding fees and costs from its previous order. 17 On July 10, 2009, the Court entered an 
Order Re: Defendants' Motion for Additional Sanctions reflecting its ruling that Plaintiff be 
precluded from proceeding on his Motion for Reconsideration until he pays Defendants the sum 
of $5,259.50. 18 On July 31, 2009, the Court entered an Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow 
Costs and Fees awarding Defendants costs in the amount of $2,334.81 and fees in the amount of 
$115,749.20. 19 Plaintiff paid the sum of $5,259.50 to Defendants pursuant to such ruling and on 
July 10, 2009. The District Court entered an Order refusing to hear Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration on September 18, 2009. 
On August 27, 2009, following the Court's refusal to hear Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration, Plaintiff! Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal pursuant to which the present brief 
is filed. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As of July 1997, Drew had been employed at Lanny Berg Chevrolet in Caldwell, Idaho 
for eight years.20 He was a salesperson in the new and used car departments for approximately 
seven and half years before being promoted to the new car sales manager in early 1997.21 Lanny 
Berg Chevrolet was a successful established car dealership and through working closely with the 
17 Tr., p. 147, II. 10-23. 
18 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1180-1182. 
19 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1169-1179. 
20 R. Vol. 2 of 6, pp. 276 
21 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 276-278,281. 
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owner/general manager, Lanny Berg Sr., Drew had acquired significant, valuable knowledge 
about how to operate a successful new car dealership?2 
In the summer of 1997, Ron began talking about purchasing a car dealership called 
Johansen Motors in Emmett, Idaho.23 Despite the fact he did not have any experience with new 
car sales, or owning and operating a new car dealership, Ron wanted to convert Johansen Motors 
into a new car dealership.24 Ron consistently expressed to members of his family that he wanted 
to purchase Johansen Motors but could not do so on his own because he did not have experience 
operating a new car dealership or working with auto manufacturers/franchisors?5 Ron further 
expressed he had no desire to learn to satisfy manufacturer/franchisor requirements and to work 
within the constraints placed upon dealerships by franchisors. 26 Based on Drew's knowledge 
and experience in operating a new car dealership, Ron requested Drew leave his employment at 
Lanny Berg and apply his knowledge and experience to establishing a new car dealership, which 
Ron would in tum give Drew when Ron retired.27 
During late July or early August 1997, Ron and Drew formed an oral contract or 
understanding whereby Ron would purchase Johansen Motors to establish a Chrysler dealership 
called Thomas Motors.28 Pursuant to the contract or understanding, Drew agreed to leave his 
employment with Lanny Berg and contribute his knowledge and experience and make all 
22 f R. Vol. 3 0 6, pp. 415-426. 
2-'R. Vol. 1 of6, p. 172. 
24 R. Vol. 3 of 6, pp. 415-444. 
25 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 416, 428, 436, 453. 
26 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 417, 430. 
27 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 281-283; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-439. 
28 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 281-283. 
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necessary efforts (at below-market compensation if necessary), to establish the dealership which 
Ron agreed to give to Drew upon Ron's retirement.29 Drew relied on this contract or 
understanding in leaving his employment with Lanny Berg. Although Ron estimated his time of 
retirement might be at age sixty-two or sixty-three, he also indicated he might retire, or semi-
retire, at an earlier or later time.3o Because Thomas Motors was to be a family business built by 
his father's contributions as well as his own, Drew and Ron discussed, and Drew felt it would be 
fair, that his father and mother receive some retirement income from the business once Ron 
retired.31 Pursuant to the contract or understanding, Drew would receive the business in 
exchange for his efforts in establishing and managing Thomas Motors's day-to-day operations, 
period.32 As evidence of such, Ron always spoke in terms of "giving" Drew the business upon 
Ron's retirement. 33 
From the time Drew left his employment with Lanny Berg in September 1997 until late 
summer 2000, Drew spent twelve to fourteen hours, six days a week working at Thomas 
Motors.34 Drew was responsible for getting the Johansen Motors premises converted and 
equipped for a new car dealership and for ensuring Thomas Motors met and maintained 
Chrysler's franchise requirements?5 Drew not only handled all human resource matters, he 
functioned as the general manager, the sales manager, the inventory manager, the finance 
29 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 281-284, 287; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-457. 
30 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-439. 
31 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 294-295; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 419-420. 
32 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 419-420. 
33 R. Vol. 2 of 6, pp. 281-284, 300; R. Vol. 3 of 6, pp. 415-451. 
34 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 420, 429, 431, 447. 
35 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 286-287; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 420-421. 
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manager and the insurance manager.36 Drew also spent a number of hours each day dealing 
directly with customers?7 In most medium size auto dealerships, such as Thomas Motors, 
separate full-time employees would have performed each of these management functions?8 
During the eight and a half years Drew managed Thomas Motors (from September 1997 
through March of 2006), he took only two vacations and his salary and other financial incentives 
were far below the market rate paid to general managers at other medium size car dealerships in 
the Treasure Valley.39 Additionally, due to the demands at Thomas Motors, Drew sacrificed 
significant time with his family and gave up pursuing his hobbies.4o From September 1997 
through August 2000, Ron never participated in the day-to-day operations of Thomas Motors.41 
He made only short visits to the Thomas Motors three or four times each week.42 Ron never 
attempted to learn about or observe the day-to-day operations of Thomas Motors, and 
continuously expressed his disinterest in and resentment of Chrysler's franchise requirements 
and restrictions.43 When Drew went away on vacation during August of 2000, Ron was 
completely unable to manage Thomas Motors and begged Drew to return early.44 
Despite the fact Drew was expected to manage Thomas Motors' day-to-dayoperations 
and build a successful Chrysler dealership, Ron maintained strict control of all the business 
36 R. Vol.3 of6, pp. 420, 429-431, 443, 446 
37 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 421,430-431. 
38 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 420-421. 
39 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 288, 292-293,347. 
40 R. Vol. 2 of 6, pp. 285-286, 306; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-426. 
41 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 421, 430, 443, 447. 
42 R. Vol. 2 of6, p. 306; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 430, 447. 
43 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 421, 430, 443, 447. 
44 R. Vol. 2 of 6, p. 292. 
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finances. 45 Ron received all sales proceeds and other income generated from Thomas Motors 
and decided how that revenue would be applied.46 However, Ron refused to apply revenue to 
things which were absolutely crucial to building a successful new car dealership. Ron refused to 
pay competitive salaries and commissions to keep good salespeople 47, he refused to pay for a 
full-time finance and insurance manager, he refused to designate funds for improvement of the 
premises, and he refused to apply funds to increase the inventory so Thomas Motors could 
remain competitive with other dealerships.48 As a result, Drew's efforts to build a successful 
new-car dealership were seriously undermined.49 
From September 1997 through August 2000, Thomas Motors had a line of credit 
("flooring line") issued by Wells Fargo used to purchase inventory for Thomas Motors.50 
Although the flooring line was to be paid with proceeds from car sales, Ron manipulated Thomas 
Motors's finances to obtain the benefit of the flooring line and sales proceeds without paying for 
inventory purchases, expenses, and debts.51 Ron also manipulated Thomas Motors' financing by 
selling used cars from his used car dealership, Lot-of-Cars, to Thomas Motors at inflated prices 
to maximize his Lot-of-Cars' profits while minimizing Thomas Motors' profits. 52 Ron further 
submitted bills to Thomas Motors for repairs, purportedly performed at a body shop he owned, 
45 R. Vol. 2 of6, p. 348; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 421, 430, 447 
46 R. Vol. 2 of6, p. 348; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 448. 
47 Ron even went so far as to refuse to pay employees overtime and to manipulate the Thomas Motors's books in 
order to create the appearance salespeople were entitled to lesser commissions than they had earned. See R. Vol. 3 of 
6, pp. 449. 
48 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-426, 440-444. 
49 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-426, 440-444. 
50 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-426, 445-457. 
51 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-426, 445-457. 
52 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 305; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 445-457. 
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on vehicles that were not owned by Thomas Motors.53 Additionally, Ron purchased used cars at 
auction with funds from Thomas Motors' flooring line and then sold the cars from his business, 
Lot-of-Cars, without transferring the sale proceeds to Thomas Motors. 54 
As of August 2000, due to Ron's improper handling and misuse of Thomas Motors' 
finances, Thomas Motors was indebted to Wells Fargo in the amount of approximately $300,000 
for disbursements made from the flooring line.55 Wells Fargo threatened to foreclose. 56 At that 
time, Drew began to reconsider investing his time and efforts in Thomas Motors based on Ron's 
financial mismanagement and the threat offoreclosure.57 
However, based on Ron's promise of future cooperation and his begging Drew to 
continue, Drew proceeded with managing Thomas MotorS.58 Accordingly, in August 2000, Ron 
assembled the Thomas Motors' staff and informed them that Thomas Motors belonged to Drew 
and only Drew would be making management decisions from that time forward. 59 
Shortly thereafter, Thomas Motors' accountant negotiated with Wells Fargo and 
succeeded in forestalling the foreclosure and gaining additional time to pay the outstanding 
flooring line.6o To increase sales to pay the flooring line and maintain the inventory, Drew 
opened Thomas Motors for business seven days a week.61 Thus, Drew continued to work twelve 
to fourteen hours a day seven days a week, rather than six, and increased the amount of time he 
53 R. Vol. 3 of 6, pp. 448. 
54 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 305; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 445-457. 
55 R. Vol. 3 of 6, pp. 422, 431, 454. 
56 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 422, 454. 
57 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 422-423. 
58 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 283, 292, 335, 359-360. 
"R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 427-434, 445-451. 
60 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-426, 452-457. 
6J R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 306-307; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 423, 431 
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spent on the sales floor. 62 In addition, Drew increased compensation and commissions to 
Thomas Motors' sales staff and hired a full-time finance and insurance manager.63 Drew's 
efforts were successful and Thomas Motors' was able to avoid foreclosure and increase its 
revenue.64 Chrysler even awarded Thomas Motors a "Five-Star" rating, normally awarded to 
larger more established dealerships.65 
Although Thomas Motors' finances improved significantly from August 2001, during 
2002 Ron obtained a new flooring line from Key Bank.66 Ron once again began manipulating 
Thomas Motors's finances and misapplying revenues.67 By March of 2006, Thomas Motors 
owed more than $200,000 for funds advanced on the flooring line issued by Key Bank.68 
In March of 2006, without informing any of his sons, including Drew, and without 
informing the staff, Ron sold Thomas Motors to an investment group headed by Bill Buclmer for 
nearly three million dollars. 69 Ron denied he was seJling Thomas Motors right up to the point of 
closing, and after closing he refused to give Drew any explanation for his actions.7o Ron flatly 
refused to compensate Drew for the tremendous efforts Drew had expended with the expectation 
62 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-434, 445-451. 
63 R. Vol. 3 of 6, pp. 415-426, 440-444. 
64 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 423, 455 
65 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 306-307; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 423, 432. 
66 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-426. 
67 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 423-424. 
68 R. Vol. 3 of 6, pp. 424. 
69 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-439, 445-457. 
70 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 307-308. 
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Thomas Motors would someday belong to him.71 Thomas Motors became Bill Buckner Chrysler 
Dodge Jeep.72 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Appellant presents the following issues on appeal: 
I. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs quasi-contract claim 
based on its finding uncontroverted evidence of an express employment agreement between the 
parties, separate from Defendants' agreement to convey the business to Plaintiff; 
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding the full amount of 
attorney fees requested by DefendantslRespondents. 
III. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Appellant hereby requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-
121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5) and 41. As a Result of the District Court's errors, this 
Court should grant the Appellant attorney fees expended in obtaining reversal of the District 
Court's decisions. Appellant reserves the right to supplement argument on this point, should this 
Court request the same at the conclusion of the matter. 
71 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 307-308. 
72 R. Vol. 3 of6, p. 425, 433. 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERImD IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S 
QUASI-CONTRACT CLAIM. 
On November 26,2007, the District Court granted summary judgment on Drew's quasi-
contract claim. 73 The District Court erroneously found "uncontroverted evidence" of an "express 
employment agreement," separate and apart from Ron's promise to transfer Thomas Motors to 
Drew upon Ron's retirement. 74 The Court found it would be improper to change the terms of the 
express employment agreement by application of the doctrine of quasi-contract.75 Accordingly, 
the Court concluded, "Plaintiffs assertion that he agreed to go to work for Thomas Motors at a 
reduced salary in consideration for Defendants' promise to transfer the business should stand or 
fall based upon the jury's determination of his express contract claim in Count 1.,,76 Despite the 
Court's finding, the evidence in the record does not support an employment contract separate and 
apart from Ron's promise to transfer Thomas Motors to Drew upon retirement. Thus, as 
discussed in further detail below, the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment on 
Drew's quasi-contract claim must be reversed. 
73 R. Vol. 4 of6, pp. 742-760. 
74 R. Vol. 4 of6, pp. 749-750. 
"R. VoI.40f6,p. 754. 
76R. VoI.40f6,p. 754. 
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i. Standard of Review 
A quasi-contract is not an actual contract, but rather a contract implied in law which 
imposes an obligation for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity. 77 Unjust enrichment, 
or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied in law. 78 The unjust 
enrichment doctrine allows recovery where the defendant has received a benefit from the 
plaintiff which it would be inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff for the value 
thereof.79 The following three elements must be established for a claim of unjust enrichment: 
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation of such benefit by the 
defendant; and (3) acceptance and retention of the benefit without payment from the defendant to 
the plaintifffor the value thereof.80 
Because unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine involving an implied contract, a party 
cannot recover under the theory of unjust enrichment if there is an enforceable express contract 
covering the same subject matter.81 However, the mere fact that an express agreement exists 
does not mean an action for unjust enrichment is improper. 82 A court is only precluded from 
77 See Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). 
78 Id. 
79 Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 573-574, 887 P.2d 1076, 1080 - 1081 (Idaho App.,1994) (citing Continental 
Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974); Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 
Idaho 737, 744, 710 P.2d 647, 654 (Ct.App.1993». 
80 Brewer v. Washington RSA No.8 Ltd. Partnership, 184 P.3d 860, 864 (Idaho, 2008) (citing Aberdeen-Springfield 
Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999). 
81 See Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1017,829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Idaho App., 1991)(citing Marshal! v. Bare, 
107 Idaho 201, 205, 687 P.2d 591, 595 (Ct.App.1984». 
82 Blaserv. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1017,829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Idaho App.,1991) (citing Wolfordv. Tankersley, 
107 Idaho 1062, 1064,695 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1985». 
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applying the unjust enrichment doctrine in contravention of an express contract when the express 
agreement is found to be enforceable.83 
ii. The Court Erred in Determining There Was an Express Employment 
Agreement Separate from Ron's Promise to Convey Thomas Motors to 
Drew. 
As set forth above, Drew alleged a breach of oral contract as Count I in his complaint. 84 
The contract involved Drew leaving his previous employment to establish and manage Thomas 
Motors at a reduced salary in exchange for Ron's promise to convey the business to Drew upon 
Ron's retirement. 85 Drew's quasi-contract claim, pled in the alternative to his breach of contract 
claim, is based on the possibility that a judge or jury might determine there was not a valid 
enforceable contract. If, as the District Court concluded, there is not a valid enforceable 
contract, then Drew's quasi-contract claim is the appropriate method of recovery. 
It is wholly inequitable for Ron to retain the benefit of all those years of Drew putting his 
efforts into the business for a reduced salary only to receive nothing from the sale of the 
business. In this case, the evidence undisputedly establishes Drew conferred benefits upon Ron, 
which Ron actually sought and also accepted under circumstances that would be wholly 
inequitable for Ron not to compensate Drew. With talk of creating a long-lasting family business 
and of giving Drew Thomas Motors when Ron retired, Ron convinced Drew to leave a highly 
satisfactory position in order to apply his knowledge of and experience in new car sales towards 
83 Id. 
84 R. Vol. 1 of!, p. 27. 
85 R. Vol. 1 of 1, p. 27. 
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establishing and building Thomas Motors. 86 For eight years, Drew spent twelve to fourteen 
hours a day, including weekends, operating Thomas Motors.87 Drew functioned in the roles of 
general manager, sales manager, inventory manager, finance manager, insurance manager, and 
salesperson simultaneously.88 While performing all these functions, which would normally be 
performed by multiple employees, Drew received a salary far below the market rate paid to 
general managers at medium size dealerships in the Treasure Valley.89 Consequently, Thomas 
Motors and Ron were benefited by the value of services, which Drew provided at well-below 
market rates in order to get Thomas Motors off the ground. In fact, Thomas Motors simply 
would not have become a viable business without the benefit of Drew's services. 
Despite Ron's mismanagement of Thomas Motors's finances and lack of cooperation 
with respect to making necessary improvements, Drew managed to establish a new car 
dealership which received a "Five-Star" rating from Chrysler.9o Moreover, it was through 
Drew's efforts alone that Thomas Motors was able to avoid foreclosure after Ron had caused the 
business to fall behind in payments on its flooring line of credit.91 Without Drew's experience, 
hard work, and persistence, Ron would not have had a viable business to sell to the Bill Bucker 
group. The evidence clearly establishes Drew expected, and Ron knew he expected, 
compensation for his efforts beyond the below-market compensation he received while he was 
operating Thomas Motors. 
86 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 281-284, 287; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-457. 
87 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 420, 429, 431, 447. 
88 R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 420-421, 429-431, 443, 446. 
89 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 288,292-293,347. 
90 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 306-307; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 423,432. 
91 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 306-307; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-434, pp. 440-451, 455. 
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Drew left his previous employment to establish and manage Thomas Motors at a reduced 
salary because Ron promised to convey the business to Drew upon Ron's retirement.92 Despite 
the uncontroverted evidence that Drew spent eight and a half years working outrageous hours 
and essentially giving up his life outside of work to build a successful business based on a 
promise that he would someday be given the business, the Court found Ron's promise to convey 
Thomas Motors to Drew was a separate promise having 'nothing to do with his express 
employment agreement.93 The Court specifically stated: 
Here, Plaintiff essentially seeks additional compensation for the services he 
performed for Thomas Motors while employed there based upon the assertion 
that, pursuant to another agreement, he agreed to accept less compensation for his 
services. Since the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the parties had an 
express employment agreement pursuant to which Plaintiff was paid a salary, 
including one or more raises during his employment, the Court finds that it would 
be improper to change the terms of that employment agreement by application of 
the doctrine of Quasi-contract. Plaintiffs assertion that he agreed to go to work 
for Thomas Motors at a reduced salary in consideration for Defendants' promise 
to transfer the business should stand or fall based upon the jury's determination of 
his express contract claim in Count 1.94 
The Court adds to its analysis with the following footnote: 
As Defendants correctly point out, applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment on 
these facts would have ht potentially pernicious effect of permitting parties to 
change the terms of an otherwise enforceable express contract by asserting a 
claim for unjust enrichment based upon an entirely separate unenforceable 
promise that supposedly altered or modified the terms of the express contract.95 
Despite the evidence in the record, the Court essentially concluded that there are two separate 
contracts: (I) an express employment agreement pursuant to which Drew was paid a salary in 
92 R. Vol. 2 of6, pp. 281-284, 287; R. Vol. 3 of6, pp. 415-457; 
93 R. Vol. 4 of6, pp. 753-754. 
94 R. VoI.40f6,p. 754. 
95 R. Vol. 4 of6, p. 754. 
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exchange for working at Thomas Motors; and (2) another agreement pursuant to which Drew 
worked at a reduced salary in eXchange for Ron's promise to transfer the business. The Court 
draws this conclusion despite the fact that Drew's work and compensation at Thomas Motors 
were directly dependent on Ron's promise to convey the business to Drew upon Ron's 
retirement. 
The District Court's determination that Drew had an express employment agreement with 
Defendants separate and apart from Ron's promise to convey the business has no basis. The 
record clearly demonstrates Drew left another promising career and dedicated eight and a half 
years of his life to developing a business that was promised to him. The District Court, 
following Defendants' lead, created a two contract analysis when such a suggestion was not 
based on the facts or pleadings. Accordingly, the District Court's bifurcation of Drew's 
employment and his reliance on his father's promise to give him the business is clearly in error. 
iii. The Court's Dismissal of Drew's Quasi-Contract Claim Was Premature 
Considering the Court's Later Determination there Was Not a Valid 
Enforceable Contract. 
Even if by this Court determines the District Court was correct in finding two separate 
agreements, it becomes apparent the District Court still erred in dismissing Drew's quasi-
contract claim. As demonstrated by the language from the District Court's opinion quoted 
above, the Court found it could not apply the unjust enric!ullent doctrine to the employment 
contract because it would be changing the terms of an otherwise enforceable express contract.96 
The Court went on to state: "Plaintiffs assertion that he agreed to go to work for Thomas Motors 
96R. VoI.4of6,p. 754. 
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at a reduced salary in consideration for Defendants' promise to transfer the business should stand 
or fall based upon the jury's determination of his express contract claim in Count I.',97 The Court 
went on to make the following comparison between this case and the Supreme Court case of 
Harbaugh v. Myran Harbaugh Matar, Inc., 100 Idaho 295 (1979): 
The Court's determination might have been different if Plaintiff were either 
challenging the validity of this employment agreement or if Plaintiff were relying 
on terms of the oral agreement clearly distinct from his employment contract with 
Thomas Motors, such as the plaintiffs in Harbaugh v. Myran Harbaugh Malar, 
Inc., 100 Idaho 295 (1979). In Harbaugh, the plaintiffs alleged that they left other 
careers to take control of their father's business in consideration for the father's 
promise to transfer the business to them. Id. at 298. The plaintiffs also contended 
the agreement provided that, in addition to their salaries, they would receive a 
credit for a portion of the net profits of the business which would accrue toward 
the eventual purchase of the business. Id. If there were a similar term in 
Plaintiffs alleged agreement here, clearly separate and distinct from his salary, 
the court would have been more inclined to find that an unjust enrichment claim is 
proper here.98 
The District Court's analysis is clearly flawed. The Court completely disregards the fact that, 
similar to the plaintiffs in Harbaugh, Drew left another career to establish Thomas Motors in 
consideration of his father's promise to transfer the business to him. Also similar to the plaintiffs 
in Harbaugh, in addition to his salary Drew was to eventually receive the business. Ron's 
promise to convey the business to Drew and Drew's salary are separate and distinct terms of 
their understanding. Accordingly, there is a similar term in this situation comparable to the 
term in Harbaugh and the fact that the situations are not identical (i.e., Drew was not receiving 
credits from the net profits) does not justify the District Court's dismissal of Drew's unjust 
enrichment claim. 
97 R. Vol. 4 of6, p. 754. 
98 R . Vol. 4 of6, p. 754. 
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In a later decision, following the District Court's dismissal of Drew's quasi-contract 
claim, the Court dismissed Drew's express contract claim in Count I finding the parties did not 
enter into a valid, enforceable contract for the transfer of Thomas Motors.99 Clearly the Court's 
dismissal of Drew's unjust enrichment claim was premature. When the District Court ruled there 
was not a valid enforceable contract to transfer Thomas Motors it had already dismissed Drew's 
equitable claim, thus, leaving him without a contract remedy and without an equitable remedy. 
Had the District Court found a valid enforceable contract pursuant to Count I, there 
would be no reason for Drew's equitable quasi-contract claim. As set forth above, the Court 
initially found an enforceable contract, justifying dismissal of the quasi-contract. 100 However, 
when the District Court later reversed itself determining there was no contractlOl the Court's 
error in dismissing the quasi-contract claim became critical considering a court is only precluded 
from applying the unjust enrichment doctrine in contravention of an express contract when the 
express agreement is found to be enforceable. 102 Clearly the District Court erred in dismissing 
the unjust enrichment claim only to later find the contract unenforceable. 
As set forth above, not only did the Court err in determining there were two separate 
agreements, the Court further erred in determining unjust enrichment should be dismissed as to 
both agreements. Accordingly, the District Court's grant of summary judgment on Drew's 
quasi-contract claim must be reversed. 
99 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1075-1087. 
100 R. Vol. 4 of6, p. 754. 
101 R. Vol. 6 of6, p. 1085. 
102 Biaser, 121 Idaho at 1017, 829 P.2d at 1366 (citing Wolford, 107 Idaho at 1064,695 P.2d at 1203). 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES WHICH ARE EXCESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE. 
On July 31, 2009, the District Court granted attorney fees and costs to Defendants in the 
amount of $118,084.01, pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54(e).I03 Of the total amount 
awarded, $115,749.20 was attorney fees and $2,334.81 was costs as a matter of right. The fees 
awarded represented the full amount of fees requested by Defendants. 104 Despite the fact that 
this case did not go to trial and was dismissed at summary judgment, the Court found 
$115,749.20 to be a reasonable amount of attorney fees and awarded the full amount. lOS As 
discussed in further detail below, the District Court's award of fees in this case was unreasonable 
and excessive and must be reduced. 
i. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the District Court's deternlination of the amount of fees to be 
awarded under the factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) for an abuse of discretion. I06 Rule 
54(e)(3) factors include: 
(I) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) 
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and 
ability of the attorney in the particular field oflaw; (4) the prevailing charges for 
like work; (5) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (6) the time limitations 
imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; (7) the amount involved 
and the results obtained; (8) the undesirability of the case; (9) the nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client; (10) awards in similar 
cases; and (II) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, if the court finds 
it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case. 
103 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1169-1178. 
104 R. Vol. 6 0[6, p. 1170. 
IOsR. Vol. 6 of6,pp. 1176-1178. 
106 See Meikle v. Watson, 138 Idaho 680, 684, 69 P.3d 100, 104 (2003). 
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The court may also consider any other factor it deems appropriate in the particular case. I.R.C.P. 
54( e )(3 )(L). 
Because the court's discretion to award attorney fees is limited to awarding fees which 
are reasonable, and because in determining a reasonable amount of fees the court must consider 
the specific factors set forth in Rule 54( e )(3), a party seeking fees must present the court with 
sufficient information from which to determine a reasonable fee award based upon the Rule 
54(e)(3).107 In other words, the party seeking fees has the burden to supply the court with 
sufficient information from which to determine the reasonableness of the fees requested and a 
reasonable amount to be awarded. 108 In Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra, the Supreme Court 
ofIdaho addressed the moving party's burden to supply information to the court: 
If we require the trial court to consider the enumerated factors in rule 54( e )(3), 
then it logically follows as a corollary that the court must have sufficient 
information at its disposal concerning those factors. Some information may 
come from the court's own knowledge and experience, some may come from the 
record of the case, but some obviously can only be supplied by the attorney of the 
party who is requesting the fee award .... 
We believe it is incumbent upon a party seeking attorney fees to present 
sufficient information for the court to consider factors as they specifically 
relate to the prevailing party or parties seeking fees. 109 
Further, among the factors the trial court should consider in determining a reasonable fee award 
is whether the moving party's counsel has made a good faith effort to exclude from the fee 
request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. I 10 
107 See Sun Valley Potato Growers, 139 Idaho 761,769,86 P.3d 475,483 (2004) 
108 See Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra; Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, III P.3d 110, 120 (2005). 
109 Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra (citing Hackett v, Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ct. App. 
1985) (emphasis added) (affirming the district court's denial ofa fee award on the basis the moving party failed to 
present sufficient information for the court to consider the Rule 54 factors). 
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ii. The District Court Abused its Discretion When it Applied the Factors Set 
Forth in I.R.CP. 54(e)(3) and Awarded Defendants All of the Fees Sought. 
In this case, the fees sought by Defendants, and granted by the District Court, are clearly 
unreasonable and excessive. In its decision, the District Court was not specific in its application 
of the 54( e )(3) factors but rather provided the following analysis: 
After considering the record in this action and applying the factors set forth in 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3), the court awards Defendants attorney fees in the amount of 
$115,749.20. Although Plaintiff objects to the reasonableness of the attorney 
fees, Defendants were in the position that they had to respond to and defend 
against the litigation driven by the Plaintiff. A very significant amount of time 
and labor had to be expended by Defendants to conduct discovery, to respond to 
the activity of Plaintiff s counsel, and to raise the matters Defendants believed 
were important. From the Court's own perspective, this case has demanded a 
significant amount of time on a myriad of matters. The Court certainly cannot 
find that Defendants were wasteful in their approach to this litigation, caused 
unnecessary expense, or were not reasonable in the way they conducted this 
lawsuit. The Court finds that the attorney fees claimed by the Defendants are 
reasonable. III 
Although there were multiple issues involved in this case, it cannot be said that the issues 
involved-breach of contract and quasi-contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing and fraud-were particularly novel or complex. Further, all but two claims, breach 
of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, were dismissed early 
in the case in November 2007 pursuant to Defendants' initial summary judgment motion. llz 
110 See Green v. Baca, 225 F.R.D. 612, 614-15 (C.D. California 2005)(applying the same factors as those set forth 
in l.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) to determine a reasonable attorney fee award pursuant to F.R.C.P. 37(a)(4)(A»; See Rohr v. 
Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 692, 800 P.2d 85, 88 (1990) ("It is well established that our adoption of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure is presumably with the interpretation placed upon similar language in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure by the federal courts. [Citations omitted]."); see also Hoopes v. Deere & Company, 117 Idaho 386, 
389,788 P.2d 201, 204 (1990). 
111 R. Vol. 6 of6, p. 1178. 
112 R. Vol. 4 0[6, pp. 742-760. 
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Defense counsel spent in excess of 50 hours between 6/27/2006 and 7/1812007 compiling 
Defendants' first summary judgment motion. I13 Not to mention the more than 30 hours spent 
between 8/13/2007 and 8/17/2007 reviewing Plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment and 
preparing Defendants' reply. I 14 Even after expending more than 80 hours on the first motion for 
summary judgment, which included briefing on the two remaining claims, defense counsel spent 
approximately 50 more hours briefing summary judgment motions on the remaining two claims, 
which were also briefed in the first motion. I IS 
Despite the District Court's finding all Defendants' claimed attorney fees reasonable, 
clearly the amount of time spent by defense counsel is excessive considering the limited legal 
issues and the repetitive nature of the summary judgment memorandums. Further, the fact that 
such summary judgment memorandums, as well as the numerous other motions and responses 
and hearing notices, were drafted and redrafted and reviewed by a partner billing at $200/hour, 
rather than an associate or paralegal billing at a lesser rate, is demonstrative of the excessive and 
unreasonable fees incurred by Defendants. 
In addition to the time spent drafting the motions for summary judgment, defense counsel 
John Janis spent 8 hours on 10/10/2007 reviewing pleadings and preparing his argument for the 
summary judgment hearing the following day.116 This does not include the hours spent between 
10105/07 and 10109i07 reviewing and organizing the motion pleadings and preparing for the 
113 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1112-1113. 
114 R. Vol. 6 of6, p. 1113. 
115 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1114-1117 (partial motion for summary judgment 3/7/08-4/28108; second motion for summary 
judgment 4/3109-4/30/09). 
116R. Vol. 6 of6, p. 1114. 
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hearing; not to mention the additional 8 hours spent the following day attending the hearing and 
then discussing the case with co-counsel and the c1ients.lI7 Clearly 16 hours for preparation and 
argument at a motion hearing is excessive. 
Further, it is important to note that this case never went to trial. The $115,000 plus in 
attorney fees did not include any trial preparation or trial time and from November 2007 forward 
was a case involving two claims, breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
Despite the District Court's ruling that "this case has demanded a significant amount of 
time on a myriad of matters,"1 18 Defendants failed to show that this case was particularly 
undesirable or involved difficult or novel questions that were time and labor intensive. Although 
Defendants claim the "ink dating" was something that made this case "unique and 
complicated,,,119 the ink dating issue was fairly minor and does not justify the huge amount of 
fees awarded in this case. It is also unclear how what relevance the ink dating issue has to do 
with the novelty of issues or the amount of time spent on such issue with respect to Defendants 
considering Plaintiff is the party who hired an expert to examine the documents. Defendants 
were not overly involved in the ink dating issue considering they merely were required to 
provide Plaintiff with the original documents in order that Plaintiff could provide them to his 
expert. Further, from the fee records provided, it does not appear the ink dating was an issue that 
117 R. Vol. 60[6, p. 1114. 
118 R. Vol. 6 0[6, p. 1178. 
119 R. Vol. 6 0[6, p. 1126. 
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took up the extreme amounts of time as Defendants' claim. 12o Clearly Defendants' limited 
involvement in the ink dating is not justification for awarding exorbitant fees on a fairly 
straightforward case. 
The District Court found "a very significant amount of time and labor had to be 
expended" to conduct and respond to discovery and "to raise the matters Defendants believed 
were important.,,121 However, discovery in this case was not unique from discovery in other 
contract cases and there is no reason why it should be characterized as overly time intensive. 
Clearly the legal issues in this case, breach of contract and quasi-contract, breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraud, were standard to many litigation cases and do 
not support the excessive fees awarded to Defendants. Accordingly, the exorbitant fees awarded 
Defendants by the District Court must be drastically reduced. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Plaintiff/Appellant Drew Thomas respectfully 
requests this case be reversed and remanded back to the District Court based on the following: 
(1) the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff/Appellant's quasi-contract claim based on its 
finding an express employment agreement separate from the agreement to convey the business; 
and (2) the District Court abused its discretion in awarding excessive and unreasonable attorney 
fees in the full amount sought by Defendants/Respondents. 
120 R. Vol. 6 of6, pp. 1112-1118. 
121 R. Vol. 6 of6 p. 1178. 
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DATED this 27th day of January, 2010. 
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC 
BY,k~~;( 
William A. Mo w 
Shelli D. Stewart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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